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We have investigated various topics in game theory, some of them are related (in var-
ious degrees) to both the cooperative and the strategic approaches, some are concerned
with foundational issues. Major part of the research has been a natural continuation
of the work we had performed in a previous OTKA project (T46194: Game Theory).
During the four and a half years of the current project, however, we have also addressed
new questions originally not foreseen and planned. In 2010, the original team of the
three senior researchers (Forgó, Pintér, Solymosi) was extended by Dezs® Bednay, a
PhD student working on closely related issues.
In the proposal we stated that our goal is to achieve results publishable in high-level
journals, and to have a total of 10-12 presentations at signiﬁcant conferences, and even-
tually a total of 6-8 articles in respected periodicals of the ﬁeld. We have succeeded
to surpass all these ﬁgures: already 9 articles appeared in well-respected international
journals (and 2-4 more articles are expected to come out in the near future from the
available pool of submissions and manuscripts); 5 papers in domestic journals; 2 pa-
pers in an edited volume; more than 20 presentations at international conferences and
workshops; and more than 10 talks at domestic conferences.
On the other hand, we came short on our "secondary" goal to produce an improved
and extended "second edition" of our "electronic" book "Játékelmélet" ([9]).
The Corvinus Game Theory Seminar has become a regular forum (with at least
10 talks each semester) for colleagues and students interested in Game Theory and its
applications to Economics and other social sciences. To disseminate information we
maintain the webpage http://gametheory.uni-corvinus.hu/index.html .
Following the structure of the project proposal, we summarize the achieved results
topic by topic. We list our papers related to this project separately from the general
literature and refer to them in a diﬀerent style.
1 Implementing the L-Nash bargaining solution
The "Nash program" initiated in [24] is a research agenda aiming at representing every
axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reason-
able non-cooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution ﬁrst deﬁned by Forgó ([8])
is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement
point goes to negative inﬁnity in a ﬁxed direction.
Forgó and Fülöp (2008) establish ﬁnite bounds for the penalty of disagreement in
certain special two-person games, making it possible to apply all the implementation
models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a ﬁnite disagreement point to obtain
the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not
work, a version of Rubinstein's alternative oﬀer game ([31]) is shown to asymptotically
implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one
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of the players, then a modiﬁcation of Howard's game ([17]) also implements the L-Nash
solution.
2 New protocols for correlated equilibria
It is a long-standing problem in multiperson conﬂict/cooperation situations (games)
how to achieve the best social outcome in equilibrium with indirect methods, that is,
by devising pre-game scenarios (protocols) leading as close as possible to the maximum
social welfare (measured as the sum of utilities) while agents (players) are driven by
self-interest. Correlated equilibrium and its generalizations can do this in many classes
of games. The diﬀerent pre-game scenarios may improve on the achievable social welfare
while maintaining the self-enforcing character of equilibrium.
Correlated equilibrium (CE), introduced by Aumann ([2]), is a particular general-
ization of Nash equilibrium (NE). It has proved to be very useful in several ways. One
of them is that it allows to realize, in equilibrium, payoﬀs strictly better for all players
than those of any NE's. Yet, for some classes of games, where intuition would call for
solutions that are more in line with conventional wisdom, correlated equilibrium does
not help. Moulin and Vial ([23]) provide the ﬁrst departure from Aumann's protocol of
a CE. Their concept, called weak correlated equilibrium (WCE) could provide strictly
better pay-oﬀs that can be realized in any CE. There are games, however, where even
the WCE protocol does not help in achieving desirable outcomes. During the project
other reasonable protocols have been devised which give rise to generalized CE's which
may provide better outcomes for each player than any WCE.
Forgó (2010) introduces for n-person ﬁnite games in normal form a new correlation
scheme, leading to a special equilibrium called soft correlated equilibrium (SCE). This
scheme can lead to Pareto-better outcomes than Moulin and Vial's WCE extension. The
informational and interpretational aspects of soft correlated equilibria are discussed in
detail. The power of the SCE generalization is illustrated for dichotomous games in
general and for some 2-by-2 games (prisoners' dilemma and the game of chicken).
In another paper, Forgó (2011) applies the concept of soft correlated equilibrium for
two-person ﬁnite games in extensive form with perfect information. Again, this scheme
can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational
issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are con-
sidered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is
given for a special procedure called "subgame perfect optimization".
3 Sensitivity of core allocations in assignment markets
Assignment markets are special two-sided markets with indivisible goods and money,
where each buyer and seller places a monetary value on each of the objects. Shapley and
Shubik ([33]) showed that in these markets the set of competitive equilibrium payoﬀs
coincides with the core of the related assignment games. Moreover, there always exist
two eﬃciently computable special core allocations, one is simultaneously the best for
all buyers (and the worst for all sellers), the other one is seller-optimal. Several papers
(e.g. [18], [5]) address the importance of the minimum equilibrium prices related to the
buyer-optimal core allocation in mechanism design for these markets. If, for example,
a sealed-bid multi-item auction ([6]) is used to determine these prices, the buyers have
no incentives to falsify their stated valuations. The sellers, however, can manipulate the
process to their beneﬁts, some of them might even realize the full amounts by which they
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falsiﬁed their reservation prices. We aimed at investigating the individual manipulabil-
ity of certain equilibrium price mechanisms in assignment markets, which are related
to eﬃciently computable, well-known core allocations of the corresponding assignment
games.
Solymosi (2010) considers the fair equilibrium prices ([39]), i.e. the average of
the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal prices, which are related to the tau-value of
the corresponding assignment game ([26]). It is shown that this midpoint is linewise
monotonic, that is, if we change each entry in a row or a column of the proﬁt matrix by
the same amount but keep all other entries ﬁxed, the payoﬀ of the corresponding player
cannot decrease. Moreover, a sharp upper bound is established for the extent the payoﬀ
of an agent can increase, if he unilaterally falsiﬁes his stated valuation(s). The proof
relies on a new characterization of the buyer-/seller-optimal allocations, which can also
be used for their eﬃcient computation.
Solymosi (2011) proves linewise monotonicity for the nucleolus in assignment games
and also establishes a sharp upper bound for the extent the payoﬀ of an agent can
increase, if he unilaterally falsiﬁes his stated valuation(s). The nucleolus lies in the
lexicographic center of the core and it is also eﬃciently computable ([37]). Another
kind of monotonicity, pairwise monotonicity of the nucleolus is proved in the paper
(Solymosi et al., 2012). It means that if we increase one entry in the pairwise proﬁt
matrix but keep all other entries ﬁxed, the nucleolus payoﬀ of neither of the two involved
players can decrease. The ﬁrst draft of this paper was prepared during our previous
OTKA project, the current revised version contains a simpliﬁed (yet not too compact)
proof.
Solymosi (2012) discusses the computability of extreme core points in assigment
games. It is shown that all extreme points (not just the seller- and buyer-optimal ones)
can be determined as the outcome of an eﬃcient lexicographic optimization procedure.
4 Regression games
The question of measuring the relative importance of explanatory variables in linear
regression models is very important, but has not been settled in the applied statistics
mainstream ([10]). The eﬀorts to avoid the ad-hoc nature of stepwise methods, but
to maintain the idea that assessing relative importance can be based on the marginal
impacts of the explanatory variables along sequences of regressors have lead authors
(sometimes unaware of the connection) to suggest metrics which are in fact the Shapley
values in suitable coalitional games ([4], [38], [34], [19]).
Pintér ([29]) has already formulated coalitional games which can meaningfully cor-
respond to regression models. He has succeeded in characterizing the Shapley value on
this class of games, called regression games, by the potential approach of Hart and Mas-
Colell ([12],[13]), and has concluded that the axioms involved make good sense in the
given context.
Continuing these investigations, Pintér (2011a) provides another solid theoretical
background for the use of the Shapley value in measuring the relative importance of
regressor variables. He shows that also Young's axiomatization ([40]) of the Shapley
value works on the class of regression games, and provides solid statistical interpretations
of the used axioms (eﬃciency, symmetry, and strong monotonicity). The main task of
settling uniqueness (namely, whether or not only the Shapley value satisﬁes this set of
axioms on the class of regression games) turns out to be non-trivial, since the family
of regression games is a proper, but neither open nor closed subset (in the Euclidean
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metrics) of the class of monotonic games. (The interrelations between the sets of axioms
and the structures of their domain had to be studied on a purely game theoretic level,
see the separate research topic below).
5 On axiomatizations of the Shapley value
Cost or beneﬁt allocation is a tough problem in managerial accounting. It occurs when-
ever joint overhead costs or the beneﬁts of cooperation have to be allocated to the
participating divisions of a ﬁrm. The use of coalitional game theory, and especially of
the Shapley value because of its marginalistic nature, to such problems was advocated
ﬁrst by Shubik [35]. A fair allocation can be obtained by computing the value of an
appropriate transferable utility coalitional game, provided the allocation principles rele-
vant to the given problem are captured by the Shapley value. This necessitates to have
various characterizations of the Shapley value for various subclasses of games.
In this research topic, Pintér has examined several characterizations of the Shapley
value, including the three best known ones: (1) the potential approach of Hart and
Mas-Colell [12]; (2) Shapley's [32] original axiomatization improved later by Dubey [7],
and by Peleg and Sudhölter [27]; and (3) Young's [40] characterization puriﬁed later
by Neyman [25]. Pintér (2012) obtains a new proof for Young's characterization of the
Shapley value. This new proof makes it possible to show that the given characterization
is valid on some further subclasses of transferable utility games not yet discussed in the
literature (e.g., the class of regression games, see the topic above).
Pintér (2009) considers several characterizations on sixteen classes of games (essential
/ (strictly) convex / (strictly) superadditive / (strictly) weakly superadditive / (strictly)
monotonic / additive / (strictly) subadditive / (strictly) weakly subadditive / (strictly)
concave games) and veriﬁes or falsiﬁes the mentioned characterizations on each of these
classes.
Kóczy and Pintér (2011) introduce generalized weighted voting games and investigate
axiomatizations of the Shapley value for this class of games. The diﬀerence between gen-
eralized and ordinary weighted voting games is that in the former some players might be
absent. Being absent is not strategic but stochastic, so the generalized weighted voting
games are the mix of ordinary weighted voting games and the zero games (where too
many players are missing, so the legislation cannot work). Based on Young's axiomati-
zation of the Shapley value, the Shapley-Shubik index is characterized on this class of
games.
Another application of the axiomatization results is to the class of risk allocation
games (closely related to exact and totally balanced games). Balog et al. (2010) discuss
ﬁnancial applications of the Shapley value. In a related paper, Balog et al. (2010)
apply the tools of cooperative game theory in ﬁnance. They compare some common risk
allocation methods and well-known TU cooperative games solutions. The conclusion is
that the Shapley value and the nucleolus perform better then the other risk allocation
methods.
6 Reasonable universal complete type space
The universal type space in a ﬁxed category of type spaces is a type space (1) which is
in the given category, and (2) into which every type space in the given category can be
mapped in a unique way. A type space is complete, if every relevant hierarchy of beliefs
is a type in that space. The existence of a purely measurable universal type space was
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proved by Heifetz and Samet [15]. The same authors, however, gave an example ([16])
which demonstrates that a purely measurable universal type space is not complete in
the sense of coherency. On the other hand, several papers ([22], [3], [14], [21], [28]) use
compact regular probability measures and obtain, in this stricter sense, complete type
spaces. These type spaces, however, are neither purely measurable nor universal in the
category used by Heifetz and Samet in [15].
In this research topic Pintér has examined the existence of a universal complete type
space in a category of type spaces which is "reasonable" in the sense that it somehow
takes into account the players' cognitive abilities. This requirement becomes clear if one
compares the categories of topological type spaces (see e.g. [14]) to the categories of
purely measurable type spaces (see [15]). The concept of measurability itself is closer to
the cognitive constraints of human beings than that of topology.
Pintér (2010a) constructs a counterexample, which shows that the Harsanyi program
does not work in topological type spaces, therefore no universal topological type space
exists.
Pintér (2010b) proves the existence of an inverse limit of an inverse system of measure
spaces in a special case. This result gives the mathematical foundation of a positive
result on measurable type spaces. Combined with results of Heifetz and Samet ([15])
and of Meier ([20]), these results imply that the Harsanyi program works in the purely
measurable framework.
7 Other results
In this section we summarize the results achieved during this project but which were
originally not proposed.
Bednay (2012a) characterizes all von Neumann  Morgenstern stable sets in assign-
ment games with one seller and many buyers as those sets of imputations which are
the graphs of a certain type of continuous and monotone functions. The standards of
behavior encompassed by the various stable sets can then naturally be interpreted as
possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form
bidding rings. It is also shown that the union of all stable sets can be described as the
union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoﬀ vectors.
Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however,
typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.
Bednay (2012b) considers stable sets from a bargaining perspective. The stable set
of a cooperative game is a set of imputations that satisﬁes the internal- and external
stability properties. Harsanyi ([11]) criticised this concept because it neglects the eﬀect
of indirect dominance. He introduced the class of absolutely stable games in which
indirect dominance is irrelevant. He showed that in this class we can get a stable set as
the ﬁxed point of an equilibrium strategy proﬁle in a bargaining game. In the class of
assignment games (which is not the subset of absolutely stable games) the same results
are obtained: a bargaining game is deﬁned in which the ﬁxed points of the equilibrium
strategy proﬁles are stable sets, and vice versa, we can get every stable set as the set of
ﬁxed points.
Csóka et al. (2011) introduce the notion of exactness for non-transferable utility
(NTU) games and relate it to various notions of convexity known for NTU games. The
conclusion is that except cardinal convexity, all other considered notions of convexity
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(e.g., ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge, and marginal convexity) imply exact-
ness.
Pintér (2011b) considers TU games with inﬁnite many players and generalizes to this
setting the concepts of the core and of balancedness. He extends the classical Bondareva-
Shapley theorem by showing that the core of a TU game with arbitrary many players is
not empty if and only if the game is balanced. This result is obtained by applying a new
purely algebraic strong duality theorem.
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